Case study · Identity and fraud

Raising the cost of a fake face: deepfake-resistant customer onboarding for a Saudi digital bank

A Saudi digital bank onboarded customers entirely through its app, using a selfie video matched to an ID document. Deepfake tools were making that check cheaper to beat. The goal was to raise the cost of a fake identity well above the cost of the defences, without making genuine customers suffer.

Case studyBanking · Saudi ArabiaSumanta Mukhopadhyay9 min read
#security#ai#architecture
CASE STUDY · CASE STUDY · IDENTITY AND FRAUD29 Oct 2026 · 23:05 GST
At a glance
SectorBanking · Saudi Arabia
My roleFractional CTO and security architect
EngagementThreat assessment, architecture and delivery leadership
ScopeRemote onboarding, device integrity, liveness, risk scoring, data handling, review operations
What changed
  • Onboarding sessions bound to genuine devices and cameras, not injected video
  • Several independent signals combined, so no single check decides
  • Higher-risk applications routed to trained reviewers with clear guidance
  • Biometric and identity data processed in the Kingdom with tight retention
  • Fraud patterns fed back into rules and models continuously
Mobile app with device attestationLiveness detectionDocument verificationRisk scoring serviceCase management for reviewersContent provenance checksIn-Kingdom data processingOpenTelemetry

Anonymised composite. Client names, identifying details and confidential figures are withheld; public facts are cited in the references.

The situation

A digital bank in Saudi Arabia opened accounts entirely in its app: the customer photographed their ID, recorded a short selfie video, and a vendor's model compared the two. It worked well for genuine customers. Fraud teams were seeing more attempts that looked like synthetic faces and replayed or injected video, and the existing check had one weak point: if the video was convincing, the account opened.

Why now. On 15 October 2026, SDAIA and the Communications, Space and Technology Commission launched the "It's AI" campaign on the risks of deepfakes, including fraud and identity theft, as part of Saudi Arabia's Year of AI1. The CST's guidance lists countermeasures including labelling AI-generated content, detection tools and international provenance standards such as C2PA2. For a bank whose front door is a camera, the message was clear: assume faces and voices can be faked.

What had to be true

  • No single check decides: several independent signals combine into a risk score.
  • Trust the capture, not just the content: prove video came from a genuine camera on a genuine device.
  • Genuine customers barely notice; friction rises only with risk.
  • Personal and biometric data handled under the PDPL, processed in the Kingdom and kept briefly34.
  • People in the loop for the hard cases, with good tools and guidance.

Architecture

Capture
Device attestationgenuine device and appCamera integritydetect injected videoGuided captureID and selfie
Verify
Livenessactive and passiveFace matchselfie to documentDocument checkssecurity featuresProvenancecontent credentials where present
Decide
Risk scoringsignals combinedStep-upextra checks by riskReviewer queuehard cases
Data
In-Kingdom processingvendor and bankShort retentionbiometrics deleted promptlyAudit traildecisions and reasons
Learn
Fraud feedbackconfirmed casesTelemetrysignal performance
The capture layer protects everything above it: if the camera feed is fake, no model downstream can be trusted.

The data flow, end to end

  1. AttestThe app proves it runs unmodified on a genuine device
  2. CaptureID and selfie video captured with camera integrity checks
  3. VerifyLiveness, face match and document checks run in parallel
  4. ScoreSignals combined with device, network and behavioural context
  5. RouteLow risk opens; medium steps up; high goes to a reviewer
  6. LearnConfirmed fraud updates rules and thresholds
Friction follows risk: most genuine customers never see the extra steps.

The hard part: attacks that never touch the camera

The most dangerous attacks skip the camera altogether, feeding generated or replayed video into a tampered app or emulator. Better face models do not help if the input is fake. The answer was to raise the attacker's cost at the capture step: device and app attestation, plus camera integrity checks, so injected video fails before any face comparison runs. The same reasoning appears in security design elsewhere: in the Model Context Protocol's analysis of client impersonation, adding attestation moves an attack from cheap to costly6.

Chart plotting attacker cost against mitigation cost: an attacker-controlled web callback is cheap to attack and cheap to mitigate, a local callback costs more, and a local callback with attestation sits highest for attacker cost
Attestation raises attacker cost more than any downstream check: the same principle applies to onboarding video. Source: Model Context Protocol blog, Paul Carleton · CC BY 4.0

Do not try to out-detect every deepfake. Make faking the capture expensive, and combine enough independent signals that no single fake is enough.

Where documents or media carried content credentials, the platform recorded them as one more signal; provenance standards such as C2PA are designed to show how content was created and edited5. Their absence was never treated as proof of fraud. Related reading: defender-first AI and patch cycles and detecting fraud rings with a knowledge graph.

How it ran

Fraud and risk
  1. Attack scenarios
  2. Risk thresholds
  3. Reviewer guidance
Engineering
  1. Attestation and capture
  2. Risk scoring service
  3. Telemetry and feedback
Compliance and vendors
  1. PDPL and retention
  2. In-Kingdom processing
  3. Vendor testing evidence
Fraud set thresholds from real attempts; engineering made every signal measurable.
Phase 1Threats
  • Red-team the flow
  • Injected and replayed video
  • Document fraud
Phase 2Capture
  • Device attestation
  • Camera integrity
  • Guided capture
Phase 3Decide
  • Risk scoring
  • Step-up flows
  • Reviewer tools
Phase 4Improve
  • Fraud feedback loop
  • Retention tuning
  • Quarterly red-teaming
Red-team first: the tests showed where the real weakness was, at capture.

Key decisions and trade-offs

DecisionAlternativeWhy
Secure the capture step firstBuy a better deepfake detectorInjected video bypasses any detector downstream
Combine independent signalsOne strong biometric checkAn attacker must defeat several things at once
Risk-based step-upExtra checks for everyoneGenuine customers keep a fast journey
Human review for high riskAutomatic rejectionFewer false rejections, better fraud learning
In-Kingdom processing, short retentionVendor processing abroadSimpler under PDPL transfer rules and less to lose

What I'd do again, and differently

Again: red-team the onboarding flow before buying anything; it showed the weak point was capture, not matching. Differently: build reviewer tooling earlier. The quality of human decisions on hard cases depended more on the tools than on the guidance. See also Saudi PDPL and cross-border AI.

If you run digital onboarding in Saudi Arabia or the Gulf, my work with Saudi companies explains how I approach it, or analyse your challenge and bring the result to a call.

References
  1. 1
  2. 2
    It's AI: deepfake awarenessCommunications, Space and Technology Commission
  3. 3
  4. 4
  5. 5
    C2PA specificationsCoalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity
  6. 6
    Evolving OAuth client registration in the Model Context ProtocolModel Context Protocol blog (Paul Carleton) · 22 Aug 2025
FAQ

Common questions

Can liveness detection alone stop deepfakes?

No single check is enough. Attackers can inject pre-recorded or generated video directly into the app, bypassing the camera, so liveness should be combined with device and camera integrity, document checks and behavioural risk signals.

What is device attestation in onboarding?

A way for the app to prove it is running unmodified on a genuine device, so the bank can trust that video and images came from the real camera rather than being injected by an emulator or tampered app.

How does Saudi data protection law affect biometric onboarding?

Biometric and identity data are personal data under the PDPL, and transfers outside the Kingdom need an appropriate basis and safeguards. Processing in the Kingdom and keeping retention short simplifies compliance; legal interpretation stays with counsel.

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